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Capital Controls and International Trade Finance 
in a Dual Exchange Rate Regime: 
The Belgian Experience Post-Mortem 
By 
Paul Reding and Jean-Marie Viaene 
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Capital Controls and Insulation: Comparative Statics. - IV. The Belgian Dual Market 
as Case Study. - V. Conclusions. - Appendix. 
I. Introduction 
M 
" any countr ies  t have used dual  exchange markets  to insulate 
their  economies  f rom foreign financial disturbances,  while 
. a t  the same time retaining the benefits o f  fixed exchange 
rates for  their in ternat ional  trade.  Cur ren t  account  t ransact ions are 
typically rou ted  th rough  an "off icial  m a r k e t "  where the authori t ies  
manage  the exchange rate th rough  interventions.  Capital  accoun t  
t ransact ions are assigned to  a " f ree  m a r k e t "  character ized by a pure  
float. 
The  l i terature on  dual  exchange markets  has expanded  consider- 
ably in recent years. At ten t ion  has successively shifted f rom the insu- 
lat ion propert ies  o f  the system when the two markets  a re  t ightly seg- 
mented  (see, e.g., G a r d n e r  1985), to the equivalence between dual  
markets  and s t ra ight forward  controls  on  capital  t ransact ions (see, 
e.g., Frenkel  and Razin  1989) and to the consequences o f  a dual  ex- 
change rate system for  fiscal and mone ta ry  policy in a two-count ry  
model  (Guidot t i  and V~gh 1992). Ano the r  s t rand o f  the l i terature has 
Remark: We benefited from seminar discussions at Erasmus University, K.U. Leuven, 
Universit~ Laval, U.C. Louvain, Universit~ de Montr&d, Innocenzo Gasparini Insti- 
tute for Economic Research, the Cambridge S,,mmer Meeting of the Econometric 
Society and University of California, Irvine. 
i France and Italy during brief periods (France: August 1971-March 1974, Italy: 
January 1973-March 1974). The Belgo-Luxembourg Monetary Union is, to our 
knowledge, the only country which has operated dual markets on a continuous basis 
for a period as long as 30 years (from 1955 to 1990). A large number of developing 
countries have dual or multiple exchange markets. In 1989, the total number of coun- 
tries reported by the IMF (1989, p. 159) as practicing multiple exchange rates was 23. 
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focused on illegal operations between markets, in the sense that cur- 
rent account transactions are diverted to the "free market" in order 
to cash in on the spread between the two rates (Bhandari and Deca- 
luwe 1987; Gros 1988). Such arbitrage operations obviously weaken 
the degree of protection offered by the dual markets and reduce its 
effectiveness. 
This paper intends to pursue the analysis of the dual markets' 
effectiveness in a different direction. Illegal arbitrage between the two 
markets is not the only factor which undermines the effectiveness of 
the dual market. Even if the existing administrative separation be- 
tween markets could be strictly enforced at all times, the authorities 
might still not reap the expected benefits from dual markets. The 
reason for this is that changes in payment timing by exporters and 
importers - i.e. "leads and lags" - are in fact capital movements 
which, because they are so closely connected to commercial transac- 
tions, cannot be assigned to the "free market" and do therefore take 
place on the official market where they trigger official interventions. 
Recognizing this threat, authorities often impose specific controls on 
them. This occurs as well in single exchange regimes (see, e.g., Giovan- 
nini 1988, p. 198, for Italy and Claassen and Wyplosz 1982 for France) 
as in dual markets like Belgium (see, e.g., IMF 1982). Capital controls 
designed to restrict these types of capital flows typically take the form 
of contraints on the time period the payments may lead or lag the 
transaction. Moreover, authorities do also impose controls on the 
forward operations of  exporters and importers. The aim of these 
controls, which mainly take the form of  quantitative restrictions, is to 
restrict further the arbitrage opportunities between the spot and for- 
ward transactions. 2 
2 To illustrate, consider the following controls imposed on official market capital flows 
by the authorities in the Belgo-Luxembourg dual market (Janson 1981). On official 
spot transactions: (1)control of payment terms by imposing a maximum "lead" (e.g., 
3 months) and a maximum "lag" (e.g., 6 months) or even insisting on immediate sale 
of foreign currency export proceeds; (2) limiting the incentive for residents to accumu- 
late holdings of official foreign currencies by suppressing the interest rate they usually 
bear and by taxing the capital gain made in case of a parity change; (3) taxing the 
overdrafts on non-residents' official Belgian franc (BF) deposits with domestic banks. 
On forward transactions: (1)limitation of forward transactions for exporters and im- 
porters to forward cover operations: any profit arising from a forward transaction not 
connected to a commercial operation is taxed away; (2) imposing zero ceiling on banks' 
spot position in official foreign currencies. This last measure severely restricts arbitrage 
between the official spot and forward markets, because it leaves changes in payment 
terms by exporters and importers as the only arbitrage opportunities. Traders are fined 
when they do not comply with regulations. 
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We concentrate our analysis on the official segment of a dual 
market, postulating complete separation with the free market (except 
for exogenous illegal transactions between these two markets). Ex- 
porters and importers are allowed to change the timing of their pay- 
ments. To assess how capital controls affect the latter, we model 
explicitly not only the spot, but also the forward exchange market. To 
this end, we develop a partial equilibrium model, as standard models 
of dual exchange markets are not easily extended to risk-averse agents 
facing an uncertain exchange rate. The same difficulty exists for 
"collapsing exchange regime models" (e.g., Obstfeld 1988) which 
could also have been appropriate to analyze speculative behavior 
resulting from expected parity changes on the official market. 
We model exporters and importers as risk-averse, expected utility 
maximizers who simultaneously decide on the volume of their trans- 
actions, the mode of payment and the extent of forward cover. The 
future official rate is uncertain because interventions do not keep the 
exchange rate rigidly fixed at its parity and because parity can be 
changed. Spot market capital controls are modeled as transaction 
costs, forward controls as quantitative constraints. We are mainly 
interested in investigating to what extent the exporters' and importers' 
financial operations in the spot and forward markets undermine, for 
a given intervention policy, the insulation property of the dual market 
and in which way capital controls imposed by authorities on spot and 
forward operations are able to restore it. We show that both types of 
capital controls increase insulation, as measured by the deviation 
from uncovered interest parity. This variable combines deviations 
from covered interest parity with the forward risk premium. Controls 
on exporters' and importers' spot transactions mainly affect devia- 
tions from covered interest parity while quantitative controls of for- 
ward operations act through a change in the risk premium. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the model and 
examines the properties of its short-run equilibrium. A characteriza- 
tion of its steady state and of its rational expectation solution is 
relegated to the Appendix. Section III addresses through comparative 
static analysis the issue of the degree of insulation provided by the 
dual market, once "lead and lags", uncertainty about the future offi- 
cial exchange rate and capital controls are introduced. Section IV 
examines the Belgo-Luxembourg dual exchange market as case study. 
For a period (1975-1985) characterized by numerous exchange crises, 
we gather empirical evidence on the two variables which determine the 
degree of insulation: the deviation from covered interest parity and 
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the forward risk premium. This allows us to illustrate the behavior of 
these variables during the episode under review, and to directly test 
the explanatory power of our theoretical model. Section V concludes 
the paper. 
II. The Analytical Framework 
1. E x p o r t e r s  
Consider a small open economy with the usual types of private 
agents acting on the official segment of a dual exchange rate system: 
exporters and importers. The representative domestic exporter (out 
of n) takes his production decision for period t knowing that, because 
of trade credit, net receipts fall due at say, t + 1. He produces a level 
of output X t ascribed for exports, subject to a quadratic cost function 
with domestic input price set equal to one. He faces given foreign 
currency prices for his output and, troubled by the uncertainty of a 
nominal exchange rate at the future date, develops a strategy to lessen 
the riskiness of his position. His domestic currency profit at period 
t + 1 reads: 
/~x = tip* Xt + ( w t r t / i , - t i )  D:a - (t i-f t)  HA (1) 
- X 2 / 2  - f l ( D x , - ~ x ) 2 / 2 ,  
where " ~ ' "  denotes a random variable; ti the domestic price of foreign 
currency at time t + 1; f, the one-period forward rate prevailing at time 
t for delivery at time t + 1; p* the foreign currency price of exports; X, 
firm's output and exports; HA firm's sale of forward foreign currency; 
D~,, the contractual down-payment by foreign customers;/~, the cus- 
tomary level of receipts paid anticipatedly; r t -  1, the domestic money 
rate; i , -  1 the foreign money rate; and/~ a transaction cost parameter. 
See the Appendix for a glossary of symbols and variable names. The 
model involves two periods, the contemporaneous variables are sub- 
scripted "t"  whereas the one-step-ahead variables have no subscript. 
In this capital control environment, the exporter has two possible 
means of obtaining his payment: first, the exporter can ask his cus- 
tomer to pay at t a down-payment D~ as a result of the contracted deal 
and second, he can hedge on the forward market for the foreign cur- 
rency proceeds remaining to be paid at t + 1. 
In the first case, the exporter grants his customer a discount based 
on the foreign interest rate, w,D~Ji , ,  a proceed which is in turn in- 
vested at home to obtain w, r,D,~/i,. Advance payments give interest 
revenues but, whenever Dxt departs from the exporter's customary 
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prepayments value Dx, the exporter incurs transaction costs (to call on 
the administrative, financial departments . . . .  ). Monetary authorities 
closely moni tor  the deviations (Dxt-/5~), resort to capital controls to 
limit their extent and penalize those who do not comply with these 
regulations. This amounts  in our model  to an increase in the transac- 
tion cost parameter 8, eventually to infinity if enforcement were com- 
plete (0 <//__ oo). 
In the second case, the merchant  can sell the remaining proceeds 
of foreign currency in the forward market  and, in that case, makes a 
loss if the t + 1 spot rate exceeds the locked-in forward rate and vice 
ve r sa .  
The exporter is assumed to maximize his expected utility of profits 
with respect to the choice variables {Xt,D~,, H~t} while complying 
with the capital controls regulation: 
Maximize EU~ = i Ux(FIx(~,)) h(#) dfr (2) 
o 
subject to H:, t < p* X, - D,., (3) 
D~, _< p* X t , (4) 
and Dx,, Hxt > 0 ,  (5) 
where h(ff) is the exporter's subjective probability density function 
(p.d.f.) of ~ and U~(.) is a strictly concave Von N e u m a n n - M o r g e n -  
stern utility function. 
Constraint  (3) stems from capital control measures on the forward 
market. Only trade-related transactions are authorized and the ex- 
porter's forward sales have to be lower than (or equal to) his foreign 
currency receipts payable at t + 1. Constraint (4) reflects the fact that 
the exporter's customer is not a financial intermediary and, therefore, 
will not engage in a net credit position with respect to the exporter. 
Lastly, by means of the two nonnegativity restrictions, we introduce 
the exchange regulation that an exporter may not engage in forward 
purchases (Ha >_ 0) and the down-to-earth fact that the customer will 
not receive a deposit in foreign currency from the exporter (D~t > 0). 
As in Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) it is assumed that  the first two 
conditional moments  of the subjective p.d.f, exist such that we can 
write E(~)=~ and Var(ff)=a 2 and approximate U~(.) by a second- 
order Taylor expansion at ft. 3 Hence, on the basis of the Kuhn-Tucke r  
3 See also Newbery (1988) who shows that the use of  a mean-variance objective 
function can be justified as a second-order Taylor approximation, with a negligible 
error, to a more general utility function. 
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first-order conditions of maximizing (2) we can solve for the decision 
variables in the case when neither of the constraints (3)-(5) are bind- 
ing: 
X t = p ' f , ,  (6) 
D,.  = lO~, - A , / f l ,  (7) 
H~,, = (p* X , -  Dx,) - Rt/ct tr 2 , (8) 
where 0t is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, Rt =( f f - f t )  is the 
forward risk premium, and At = ( I t - r t  wt/it) is the deviation from cov- 
ered interest parity. It is clear from (6)-(8) that the exporter simulta- 
neously chooses a production level for export, hedges on the forward 
market and chooses an optimal down-payment. Equation (6) illus- 
trates the implication of the separation theorem. This property, shown 
by Ethier (1973), Danthine (1978), Holthausen (1979) and others state 
that the firm produces a level of exports which depends on the forward 
rate but is independent of the firm's degree of risk aversion and of the 
distribution of the exchange rate. The latter are only relevant to the 
choice of the amount of forward cover, as can be seen from (8). Hence, 
the production decision is made separately of the down-payment and 
forward-trading decisions, which are separate activities. Equations (7) 
and (8) show that the latter are motivated as well by structural as 
speculative objectives. With an unbiased forward market, i.e. a zero 
risk premium, ft = if, the firms will hedge their trade transactions com- 
pletely and the gains from speculation vanish. This is known as the 
Full-Hedging theorem (Holthausen 1979; Kawai and Zilcha 1986). 
With large transaction costs, i.e./~--. 0% or with covered interest parity 
holding, i.e. A, = 0, the gains for the firms to deviate from the custom- 
ary prepayment value disappear. 
2. I m p o r t e r s  
Domestic importers are modeled as trading houses: they buy com- 
modities on the international market at a given product price and 
retail them locally. At home, we assume that the individual importer 
i faces the inverted demand curve, Pmt=ao-a l~ . , '~=tMi t ,  with Mit 
being the individual import volume and m the number of Cournot- 
competing importers on the domestic market. The individual im- 
porter's t + 1 profit takes then the following form, the subscript i being 
put only when confusion is possible: 
Reding/Viaene: Dual Exchange Rate 7 
/ l m =  [ a o -  al (M,t + E Mi,)] Mu + (ff--ft) Hmt (9) 
jr 
-- ff q* M,, - (w t r J i , -  if) D,,n - ~ (D,,n- /),,)2/2 , 
where q* denotes the foreign currency price of imports; Hint, the im- 
porter's current purchase of forward foreign currency; D,~, the foreign 
currency down-payment  at period t ; / ) , ,  the customary level of down- 
payments; and 6 a transaction cost parameter, the other variables 
having already been defined. Again, the importer  has two possible 
means of executing his payments. First, part of the foreign currency 
payments due at t + 1 can be made in advance at the current  period 
(wtD,,,,), on which the importer  negotiates a discount based on the 
foreign interest rate i t to compensate him for the amount  rt he has to 
pay on the domestic credit extended to him. Authorities have at times 
limited this activity by affecting di (0 < ~ < oo). Second, he can hedge the 
remainder of his foreign currency bill by purchasing foreign currency 
to be delivered at t + 1. 
The importer 's optimization problem is analogous to the ex- 
porter's: 
Maximize EUs with respect to {Mit, D,~, H~} 
subject to Hst <-q* Mit - D,,~, (10) 
D,,u <_ q* Mu,  (11) 
and Dmt, Hst >_ O . (12) 
In conformity with foreign exchange prescriptions, the nonnegativity 
restriction (12) implies that  the importer  may not sell foreign currency 
forward (Hst>_O) nor, according to constraint (10), purchase more 
than the foreign currency payments due at t + 1. Constraint (11) means 
that the importer  may not anticipate more foreign currency payments 
than what is due nor, by restriction (12), borrow foreign currency from 
his supplier. The K u h n - T u c k e r  first-order conditions of maximiza- 
tion when the constraints (10) to (12) are nonbinding lead to the 
following solution: 4 
Mit = [ao-a  1 ~. M j t - q *  ft]/2a 1 , (13) 
4 Importers share with exporters a common attitude towards risk (same utility func- 
tion). While we can easily allow for diverse precisions and attitudes towards risk, this 
has no qualitative implications whatsoever except that it would make the exposition less 
transparent. See Stein (1985) on this. 
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Dmt = Dm+ At/6,  (14) 
Hmt = (q* Mit-- Din, ) + Rt/ot tr 2 , (15)' 
where A t and Rt have already been defined. If all m importers are 
identical (M~t=Mj t=M t, u the symmetric Courno t  equilibrium 
implies (14), (15) and 
Mt = ao - q*f t ,  (16) 
when al  in (13) is set, for simplicity, equal to 1/(m + 1). Compar ing  (6) 
to (16), one sees that  the forward rate affects exports and imports  in 
conformity with the conventional  terms of trade analysis. 
In the comparison of (8) and (15), recalling that  the former repre- 
sents a forward sale while the latter was defined as a forward purchase, 
it is worth  not ing that  the speculative parts lead to similar positions, 
Rt/cta 2, as both  traders share the same att i tudes towards risk. The 
hedge parts are different since, while exporters expect to receive for- 
eign currency, importers have to pay in foreign currency. As to down- 
payments,  equations (7) and (14), both  optimal levels are guided by 
their respective target levels but  react in opposite way to the market  
factor At. s 
3. C o n s t r a i n t s  o n  S p o t / F o r w a r d  A r b i t r a g e  
By substituting (8) in (3), (15) in (10), the constraints brought  about  
by specific controls on the official exchange rate market  can be rewrit- 
ten as follows: 
o <_ - 2 <_ ( p * x , - o = ) ,  
0 < ( q * M , - D ~ )  + Rt/o~a 2 ~ ( q * M , - O ~ ) .  
5 The volumes of exports and imports are priced in foreign currency, invoicing habits 
playing no role in the model. Assume instead thatj and k parameterize the proportion 
of exports and imports priced in foreign currency, respectively (0_<j, k_< 1). A new 
solution for the exporter's and importer's behavior is obtained along the line developed 
so far. First plug (6), (7) and (8) into (2) to obtain the exporter's expected utility of 
profits and use (14), (15) and (16) to obtain the importer's expected utility of profits. 
The following partial derivatives are then readily computed: OEU~/Sj=Xt(p*fs-p)/2 
and ~EU,/~k = M t (q-q*f~)/2, where p and q denote the domestic price of exports and 
imports respectively. If traders set their price at home and abroad such that P*ft--P and 
q-- q'f,, then anyj and k satisfying 0_<j_< 1 and 0_<k~ 1 generates the same expected 
utility. Hence the choice of the invoice currency is not relevant and, for simplicity, we 
can select j = k = 1. 
Reding/Viaene: Dual Exchange Rate 9 
As mentioned already, they confine the exporter and importer to 
be, respectively, a supplier and demander of forward foreign currency. 
It is readily seen that at least one of the two upper bounds is always 
reached depending on the sign of R t and it is impossible for both con- 
straints to be simultaneously binding, except with Rt = 0. Whenever Rt 
is positive, the upper constraint is active for the importer, and the 
exporter's forward sales are at an interior optimum and vice versa. 
When exporters anticipate a large future depreciation of the currency 
relative to the current forward rate (Rt > 0), Hxt may tend towards zero, 
the lower bound. However, the latter will never be observed at an 
equilibrium as the forward rate appreciates in response to the increas- 
ing excess demand for the foreign currency, bringing Hxt back to an 
interior optimum while leaving Hint at the upper bound. The same 
reasoning applies, though in opposite direction, to the importer and 
the conclusion is similar: the nonnegativity constraints implied by 
capital controls have no bearing on the problem at hand. 
A second layer of constraints, interwoven with the first two, deals 
with the advance payments. After appropriate substitutions they take 
the following form: 
o <_ - <_ p* x ,  , 
0 <_ Dm + Ag6 <_ q 'M, .  
Their interpretation is simple: advanced payments cannot be 
larger than bills and a debtor does not receive payments from the 
creditor. In substance, they have no legal connotation but reflect 
common payment practice in trade, their ultimate contribution being 
the introduction of leads in the model. The upper limit cannot be 
binding. Why? For example, when D~ = p* Xt, it follows from the first 
constraint above that H~t = 0, i.e. there is no supply of forward foreign 
currency. Given that agents in the forward market are of two types, 
either suppliers or demanders, the market is in a state where there are 
only demanders and, consequently, the equilibrium is degenerate. A 
similar analysis cannot be applied to the lower bounds, however, 
because even if D~t and/or Dmt were zero, a finite solution for the spot 
exchange rate w t would still be guaranteed because transactions stem 
from several other sources, see (17) below. Hence, the possibility of a 
negative Dxt or D~t is not totally ruled out, but the probability of its 
occurrence is assumed to be very low for sufficiently high levels of/)~ 
and/)m. All in all, there were originally 81 possible combinations of 
solutions for the model and we are left now with only three solutions: 
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one with constraint (3) binding when R, < 0, or one with constraint (10) 
binding when R, > 0, and one when R t = 0. 
4. S h o r t - R u n  E q u i l i b r i u m  
By aggregating over the respective agents and confronting market 
demand and supply, we get a market-by-market analysis of the equi- 
librium condition for the spot and forward currency markets of the 
official segment of a dual exchange regime. Equilibrium on the spot 
market is established by the following market-clearing condition: 
m D ,,,t + I t = n D :, t + S t + ut , (17) 
or, the demand for the foreign currency must equal its supply. Spot 
demand consists of m Dm,, the aggregate down-payment to be paid by 
importers, and of I t , the demand for foreign currency by the central 
bank for the purpose of interventions. Spot supply consists of (i) the 
aggregate down-payment received by exporters, n D,a ,  (ii) the spot sale 
of foreign currency induced by the previous period's speculative deci- 
sion, S t (see the Appendix for a precise specification) and (iii) a random 
term representing exogenous illegal transactions, ut. Easy substitution 
of (7) and (14) in (17) leads to the deviations from covered interest 
parity: 
(f t  - -  r ,  wt / i t )  = ), [(St + u, - It) + (n D x  - m / ) , . ) ] ,  (18 )  
where ~, defined as [(m/6) + (n / f l ) ] -  1, parameterizes the costs of making 
use of the spot market to shift payments/receipts from period t + 1 to 
period t: a higher value for ~, e.g. due to an increase in fl and/or 6, 
means higher costs and a larger deviation from covered interest parity. 
The clearing condition for the forward market takes the following 
form: 
m Hs, = n Hx,, (19) 
which, making use of (8), (15) and (18), leads to the forward market risk 
premium: 
( ~ ' -  f t )  = O [ o e f f  + e. C + e(S,  + u , -  I,)] , (20) 
where o = n p * 2 + m q * 2 > O ,  e = l / ( l + 0 0 ) > 0  are constants, and C =  
- m a  o q*< 0 is the exogenous component of net exports. The param- 
eter 0 is of special interest because it is a short-hand notation for the 
presence of capital controls on the forward market. In particular, 
0 = 9 o'2/(m-t- n) in absence of capital controls, 0 = ~ a2/n when im- 
porters are constrained (R, >0), 0= ota2/m when exporters are con- 
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strained (R t < 0). The crucial effect of the legal requirements on the 
forward market  turns out to be the limitation of the number  of agents 
who actively trade in currencies subject to capital controls. The latter 
increase therefore, as in Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), "market  
thinness." This is parameterized by an increase in 0, that  in turn 
increases the risk premium. 
To close the model, the official intervention rule by the monetary 
authorities has to be specified. Under  flexible exchange rates, a widely 
employed rule is the policy that consists in smoothing the deviations 
from a target exchange rate: 
I t = g ( w * - - w , )  + Ia, g > _ O ,  (21) 
where w* is the parity exchange rate and Iat represents central bank's 
discretionary demand for foreign currency. The parameter g measures 
the force of the official intervention policy. In addition, domestic 
interest rates only change when monetary equilibrium is disturbed by 
intervention: 
r, = r t_ 1 - co It co > 0 ,  (22) 
with co taking the value zero if the intervention policy is accompanied 
by a policy of complete sterilization that leaves the money supply un- 
affected. 
Summing up, under managed floating with (21) as intervention 
function, the short-term equilibrium consists of the following equa- 
tions: 
( f ,  - r, w J i , )  = y [(St + u,  - 0 (w*  - w,)  - Iat ) + ( ,  D, ,  - m Din)], (18') 
( w - - f t )  = O [ o e f f + e C + e ( S , + u t - o ( w * - w , )  - -  Id,)], (20') 
rt = r t -  t - -  c o g ( w * - - w , )  - -  c o l a , ,  (22') 
where (21) has been substituted in (18), (20) and (22). This system 
determines w,, f, and r,. The solutions for w t and f, are given by second 
degree equations because of the exchange ra te -domest ic  interest rate 
nexus on the LHS of (18'). It is clear by (22') that the assumption of 
either no intervention (g = 0; Id, = 0) or complete sterilization (co = 0), 
assumptions predetermining the domestic interest rate, removes the 
quadratics of the model and provides explicit solutions for f,, w, and 
Ft .6 
Under a strictly fixed exchange rate system (or if an EMS currency has reached one 
of its extreme bounds), the short-term equilibrium is described by (20), (22) as well as 
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I lL Intervention, Capital Controls and Insulation: Comparative Statics 
The  model 's  steady state and  the rat ional  expectat ion solut ion of  
the distr ibution of  the exchange rate are presented in the Appendix for 
the case ~---0. This means  that  we look for values of  wt, v~ and a 2 
which are model-generated and cor respond to a rat ional  expectat ion 
equilibrium. It is easily apparen t  f rom (A.1) that  if the two sources of  
randomness  (t~, [d) are normal ly  distributed, so is ~. If this is the case, 
this solut ion validates our  assumption that  t raders have a subjective 
distr ibution of  ~ which can be character ized by the first two moments .  
This being established, we concent ra te  on the shor t - run propert ies  
of  the model,  i.e., considering J and r as given. As under  managed  
float it is not  possible to compute  the reduced form because of  non-  
linearities in w t and r t, the compara t ive  static analysis for f t ,  wt and r t 
is performed by differentiating the system. These variables are in turn  
used to const ruct  the composi te  variables At, Rt and (A t + Rt), the last 
variable being the deviat ion f rom uncovered  interest par i ty  (DUIP).  
Table 1 summarizes the compara t ive  static effects of  increases in 
the instruments  of  the central  bank: the intensity of  official interven- 
tions, denoted  by g; a discret ionary demand  for foreign currency,  
denoted  by Id; the intensity of the capital  controls  on the spot market ,  
described by paramete r  ?, and on the forward  market ,  described by 
paramete r  0. The  purpose  of  our  analysis is to find in which way 
changes in central  bank's  actions affect the six variables of  interest. 7 
The  degree of insulation provided by the dual  marke t  cum capital  
controls  can be assessed by looking at the individual behavior  of  the 
exchange and interest rates. A more  complete  and synthetic picture is 
obtained,  however,  by looking at D U I P .  Indeed, for a given ~ and 
(18) solved for 1 t . Intervention is, in this context, compulsory and given by an amount 
that clears the spot market, i.e., (18) inverted. The solution for the three endogenous 
variables 1,, ft and r~ is then also explicit and unique. 
7 Also important is to know how these policy measures affect the welfare of the traders 
on the market. To that end, find the income transfer for exporters and for importers, 
Y~ and Y, respectively, that is the amounts agents are willing to pay or expect to receive 
for the policy action. They are implicitly defined from the merchants' expected utility 
expressions: insert (6) to (8) and (14) to (16) in the respective utility formulae twice, one 
with and one without policy action and take their difference. Central bank's policy ac- 
tions then lead to a welfare improvement for the merchants if m F. + n F x > 0. A suffi- 
cient condition for this is [r/~-(3 m-l) / (m+ 1)] df>O where r is the export supply 
price elasticity. For actions implying dr> 0 (depreciation) global welfare is improved if 
r/x > (3 m-1)/(m + 1) and vice versa: home exports are then subsidized and imports 
taxed. If m = 1 we get the monopoly condition, J?~ > 1. For m = oo the competitive 
condition is r > 3. 
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f, w, ~ a, R, (a,+e,,) 
~ I s(w*-w,) s(w*-w,) -s(w*-w,) -s(w*-wJ -s(w*-w,) -s(w*-w,) 
+ + . . . .  
s(a,) -s(A,) -s(a,) s(A,) -s(A,) s(A,) 
0 -s(R,) -s(R,) -s(R,) -s(R,) s(R,) s(R,) 
"s(.) = sign corresponds to the sign of argument. 
foreign interest rate, the lower the domestic interest rate and/or the 
exchange rate is, the better the insulation is and the larger (At + Rt) is. 
D U I P  therefore adequately measures changes in the degree of insu- 
lation. 8 The focus of our expos~ is on changes in ~ and 0, the other 
instruments being analyzed by analogy. 
An increase in the intensity of capital controls on the spot market 
(stricter regulations bearing on payment patterns) is represented by an 
increase in the parameter ~,. It appears that the effects of an increase 
of ~ depend on the initial value of At: an increase in ~ increases the 
absolute value ofA t with A t --, 0 when ~, ~ 0. Assume a positive A t. This 
increase in ~ then induces an increase in Dx, and a decrease in Dmt: each 
agent tries to respect more closely the customary prepayment terms bx 
and DIn. An excess supply of foreign currency is observed on the spot 
market, prompting a decrease in wt, purchases of foreign currency by 
authorities and a decrease in domestic interest rates. This amounts to 
an overall increase in At. The increase in Dx, and decrease in Dmt imply 
an excess demand for forward currency which calls for an increase in 
the forward rate ft. The risk premium R t declines, but the decline is not 
sufficiently large enough to offset completely the increase in At, so that 
the D U I P  also increases. Hence, stricter regulations concerning pay- 
ments on the official spot market unambiguously increase the degree 
of insulation of the domestic economy. 
The imposition of constraints on exporters' and importers' for- 
ward operations can be modelled as an increase in the parameter 0. 
When R t > 0, an increase in 0 reflects the curtailment of the importers' 
a Changes in deviations from covered interest parity seem therefore to signal correctly 
the direction of changes in the economy's degree of protection only when capital control 
measures are designed to mainly affect spot operations (as is, in this model, the case for 
~, but not for 0). When, however, capital controls are directed towards forward opera- 
tions, deviations from covered interest parity may be a misleading indicator of the 
degree of insulation. 
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forward operations: importers are obliged to restrict their purchase of 
forward currency to their import payments. When R t < 0, the increase 
in 0 reflects the constraints on the exporters' forward transactions. 
Starting from an initial R t>0 ,  an increase in 0 acts as a forward 
market intervention: the demand for currency is reduced, which drives 
down the forward rate. The resulting decrease in At induces arbitrage 
operations between spot and forward markets: Din, decreases and Dxt 
increases, net receipts are shifted from period t + 1 to period t. This 
acts as a support for the spot exchange rate: w, decreases, as do 
intervention sales of foreign currency and, therefore, the domestic 
interest rate. Although A, decreases, D U I P  increases as the increase in 
the forward risk premium outperforms the decrease in A t . 
Hitherto, in our discussion of the official market of the dual ex- 
change system only policy changes emanating from the central bank 
have been considered. But how well does the dual market insulate the 
domestic economy from shocks emanating from the rest of the world? 
Table 2 outlines the effects of three such shocks: (i) speculative attacks 
in the form of an anticipated change in the future official exchange 
rate, (ii) a foreign interest rate shock ( i -  1) and (iii) a positive shock to 
the current account (C). Only a change in ff is considered extensively, 
a change in C and ( i - 1 )  involving a reasoning known by now. 
An increase in ff induces an excess demand for forward currency 
for the purpose of speculation; ft increases, but proportionally less 
than ~. Analytically, this is so because 0 O e ~ in (20) is positive and, at 
impact, creates a positive risk premium. This wedge vanishes, how- 
ever, when risk neutrality is assumed across the board, i.e., when 0 = 0. 
Intuitively, an increase in f, ,  which would have been proportional to 
the increase in ~, would have left an excess supply of forward currency. 
Why? There are two reasons. First, with a higher forward rate ex- 
Table 2 - Insulation Properties o f  a Dual Marke t  
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porters increase their exports and their forward sales. Second, given 
the increase in f, ,  a positive A t appears (or increases) leading exporters 
to reduce the part of total receipts payable today and to increase 
thereby their forward sales. By analogy, the opposite reasoning holds 
for importers who wish on balance to reduce their forward purchases. 
The risk premium R t has therefore to increase, which stimulates agents 
to speculate, i.e., exporters (importers) to sell (buy) less (more) forward 
currency. The spot rate w t increases as a resultant of the excess demand 
for spot currency, the domestic interest rate increases by the interven- 
tion rule, A t and (A t + R,) increase as a whole. 
So far, the above reasoning corroborates the known result that, 
with imperfectly mobile capital flows (7 strictly positive), the domestic 
exchange and interest rates are partly shielded from speculative distur- 
bances. The novelty of our approach is, however, to show how the 
response of each endogenous variable to a change in ~ is shaped by 
the magnitude of the key parameters of the model. 9 It is shown in rows 
3 and 4 of Table 2 that both types of capital controls (7, 0) diminish the 
increase in w t and r t, brought about by the anticipated increase in 
and thereby reinforce DUIP.  The same results are obtained with more 
active interventions (g), although in this case the increase in the domes- 
tic interest rate is magnified. 
IV. The Belgian Dual Market as Case Study 
We try hereafter to assess the model's empirical relevance by focus- 
ing on the extent of insulation which the Belgian economy has enjoyed 
thanks to the presence of a dual market and to the various capital 
controls the authorities have imposed on "official market" capital 
flows. The 1975-85 period is in this respect particularly appropriate. 
Authorities faced during this period repeated exchange crises due to 
the sizeable overvaluation of the Belgian franc (BF) and to the diffi- 
culty to reestablish the credibility of the exchange rate parity after the 
1982 devaluation, t~ During these speculative episodes, the pressures 
9 This is done by taking the second partial derivative of the variables of interest with 
respect to ff and 7, 0 or g. 
to We stop at 1985 with our sample period because the authorities' macroeconomic 
policy had by this time reestablished the exchange target's credibility. Moreover, agents 
and authorities started to anticipate, after 1985, the abolition of the dual market in the 
wake of the upcoming European capital market integration. It is therefore questionable 
whether the dual market had in these circumstances still a normal functioning. 
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on the official exchange market were, to a large extent, the conse- 
quence of "official" capital outflows engineered by exporters and im- 
porters. Authorities severely limited the extent of these outflows by 
imposing controls on traders' spot and forward transactions. See the 
Appendix for the sources of our data. 
1. A M e a s u r e  o f  t h e  E x p e c t e d  L e v e l  a n d  
C o n d i t i o n a l  V a r i a n c e  o f  t h e  F u t u r e  E x c h a n g e  R a t e  
To investigate the behavior of R t and DUIP (At being directly ob- 
servable), it is necessary to develop a measure for the unobservables, 
and tr 2. Given that BF is an EMS currency, we start by assuming 
that agents consider two possible regimes for next period's exchange 
rate: regime 0, with parity fixed at its present level w*; regime 1 with 
a new parity w*. 
In regime O, agents determine ~ according to a target zone model. 
In such a model, the exchange rate exhibits strong mean reversion 
because of the presence of upper and lower limits to its fluctuations. 
The expected depreciation of the exchange rate is therefore negatively 
linked in a nonlinear way to the exchange rate's position in the band. 
We use the specification developed by Rose and Svensson (1991) in 
which the change in the (log of the) exchange rate is regressed on the 
current deviation of the exchange rate from parity (both in logs) as well 
as on the square and the cube of this deviation. This specification is 
estimated each month on end of month data for the official Belgian 
franc/Deutscbe mark (BF/DM) rate. Months during which a parity 
change occurred have been excluded. The estimation method involves 
rolling regressions on the last 24 months. The estimated specification 
is then used to forecast the first and second moments of next period's 
distribution of the level of the exchange rate: Et(wt+ l Jw*= Wo) is di- 
rectly derived from the regression's one-period-ahead forecast; the 
conditional variance is derived from the sample period residuals (after 
appropriate conversion of the exchange rate from logs into levels). 
In regime 1, we assume that agents expect the future spot rate to 
coincide with the new parity: E,(wt+ 1 I w* = w~') = w*. The conditional 
variance of ~ in this regime is assumed to be identical to that in 
regime0: 2 _ z 6 1 , t - - a O ,  t.  
Denoting by 'prob t' the probability, assessed in t, that regime 1 will 
be observed in period t + 1, we may now define ~t as the conditional 
expectation of the future exchange rate when both regimes are pos- 
sible: 
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wt = Et(w,+ t) = probt Et(wt+ t [w* = w*) 
+ (1 - probt) Et(wt+ 1 [w* = w~). (23) 
Similarly, it can be easily shown that  the conditional variance of 
the distribution of the exchange rate across the two possible regimes 
is, under the hypothesis that  `71.t-`7o.t,2 _ 2 given by: 
,72 = ,77,., + [E , (W,+  l Iw* - E , ( w , +  2 
prob, (1 - probt). (24) 
To give empirical content to (23) and (24), it is necessary to develop 
a measure for the probability of a parity change (probt) and for the 
expected new parity (w*). 
The probability of a regime change is constructed under the fol- 
lowing hypothesis of expectation formation: 11 agents observe at each 
moment  the deviation between the spot rate and the upper (lower) 
margin rate. At the latter rate, authorities' interventions become in- 
finitely elastic with respect to the exchange rate. It seems reasonable 
to postulate that, during a given period, the more frequently the spot 
rate hits or comes close to the upper (lower) margin rate, the higher 
will be agents' subjective probability of an imminent  change in parity. 
On this basis the probability, assessed at the end of month  t, that the 
parity will have changed by the end of month  t + 1 (prob) is defined in 
the following manner  for the case when the anticipated parity change 
is a devaluation: 
1 
probt = ~ (Nt, + N2, + N3,), 
~Ivt 
N~ t being the number  of days in month  t during which the spot rate has 
been above the (month t) parity rate w* by at least xi percent. Given 
that  the maximum deviation from parity is 2.25 percent, in accordance 
with EMS rules, we choose x t = 1.875, x 2 =2.000 and x 3 =2.125. Nt is 
the total number  of business days in month  t. Note  that, because 
exchange rates are observed at the end of the month,  prob t was set 
equal to 0 for the months  during which parity changes occurred. 
11 It departs from the "collapsing exchange regime" literature in that it does not  
directly connect the probability of devaluation to the level of international reserves. It 
seems however quite clear that the level of reserves did not play a critical role in agents' 
expectation formation, as the Belgian central bank and the government still had ample 
opportunities to borrow reserves. 
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The expected future parity in case of a change in regime, w*, is 
equal to the spot exchange rate which would reestablish the equilib- 
rium real exchange rate with respect to the Deutsche mark. The rele- 
vant real exchange rate is based on wage costs in manufacturing 
industries. The reference situation reflecting the equilibrium is the 
1970-73 period. The equilibrium spot exchange rate w* t is therefore 
given by: 
L C B  t 
w'~t = L C D t  " W~7o-73~ ' 
where L C B  t and L C D  t are indexes (base 70-73) of labor costs in 
Belgian and German manufacturing industries, respectively, and 
W~7o* - ~3~ is the 1970-73 average BF/DM parity rate. 
2. D e v i a t i o n s  f r o m  U n c o v e r e d  I n t e r e s t  P a r i t y  
DUIP combines At and Rt. Figure 1 displays At in panel (a) as well 
as the constructed series on Rt  in panel (b) and DUIP in panel (c), all 
defined in annualized percentages. Data refer to one-month interest 
BF and DM interbank rates and to BF/DM spot and forward rates, 
measured at the end of month. Dates of EMS realignments concerning 
the BF/DM rate are indicated by vertical lines in Figure 1. 
The deviations from interest parity exhibited in panel (a) are de- 
fined as the annualized difference between the domestic interest parity 
levels, i.e., as excess returns. A t appears at times very sizeable (up to 
15 percent) although on average very small, 0.5 percent. This already 
suggests, as more explicitly argumented below, that deviations occur 
during specific speculative episodes when capital controls effectively 
constrain the exporters' and importers' behavior. A comparison of 
panels (a) and (c) clearly shows that At is dwarfted by the forward risk 
premium. Although At and DUIP are strongly correlated (the sample 
correlation coefficient is 0.55), At never exceeds 15 percent, when, at 
the same time DUIP comes close to 200 percent (annualized monthly 
rate). 
A comparison of panels (b) and (c) indeed shows that the forward 
risk premium is usually fairly small, but rises to its extreme values 
when agents anticipate an imminent devaluation. The size of the ex- 
treme values of the risk premium appears nevertheless very large when 
compared to estimates of risk premia reported elsewhere. Analyzing 
survey data for floating currencies, Froot and Frankel (1989) report 
one-month risk premia of maximum 20 percent p.a. Svensson (1990) 
R e d i n g / V i a e n e :  D u a l  E x c h a n g e  R a t e  19 
F i g u r e  1 - Deviations from Covered and Uncovered Interest Parity 
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notes that in a target zone, risk premia arising from expected changes 
in parity may become important but remain nevertheless small rela- 
tive to the expected rate of parity change. In our case, the risk premia 
come close to the magnitude of expected changes in the exchange rate, 
once both are expressed in percent p.a. Therefore, under the hypothe- 
sis that the approximation of # is reasonable, ~2 these abnormally large 
risk premia may well be the direct consequence of capital controls im- 
posed by authorities on the forward market. As discussed previously, 
these kinds of capital controls decrease the number of "speculators" in 
the market and therefore increase the absolute value of risk premia. 
This reinforces the increase in the risk premium which an anticipated 
depreciation of the spot rate would, independently of any capital 
control measure, bring about. If this interpretation is correct, agents' 
risk aversion combined with authorities' capital controls on the for- 
ward market have indeed very much contributed to the shielding of 
the spot rate and the domestic interest rate. 
3. E s t i m a t e s  f o r  A t a n d  Rt 
We conclude our empirical investigation by briefly considering 
estimates of the reduced forms for A, and R r  As indicated in Table 3, 
both variables are regressed on the exogenous variables as they can be 
derived from the short-run equilibrium version of the model presented 
in Section II: the future expected rate Et (wt + 1) (scaled by w*, the parity 
exchange rate), the foreign interest rate (i t -  1), Ct and Idt. See Tables 1 
and 2 for the theoretical sign of each variable. The current account, 
defined on a transactions basis, is introduced to capture the exogenous 
supply of forward currency on the official market, Ct in (20). 1 a Discre- 
tionary interventions Idt are defined as interventions which are not 
explained by the reaction function which links interventions to devia- 
tions of the exchange rate from its target rate. Our empirical interven- 
12 To gain some preliminary comparative evidence on the quality of our measure of ~, 
we performed some of the tests developed by Frankel and Froot (1986) for their survey 
data on exchange rate expectations and obtained results similar to theirs. In particular, 
expected depreciation is strongly correlated with the risk premium. Systematic forecast- 
ing errors are also present. This points, in our case, where forecasting the future rate 
involves assessing the probability of a regime change, to a typical peso problem (see 
Krasker 1980). 
13 Variable C t in (20) stands for that part of the current account which is not sensitive 
to changes in the exchange rate between t and t+ 1. Given the one-month horizon in 
our data, we approximate this by the current accounts transactions observed in pe- 
riod t. 
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Table 3 - Deviation from Covered Interest Parity 
and Forward Risk Premium 





Equation I I Equation II 
Parameter t-statistic [ Parameter t-statistic 
--2.14 5.02 10.89 1.63 
44.35 6.67 1,032.48 31.59 
0.069 2.75 0.371 1.43 
0.352 4.85 - 3.73 2.74 
-0 .046  4.50 -0 .040 0.87 
-0.891 1.62 0.061 2.82 
- - 0.810 9.36 
0.54 0.96 
1.58 2.31 
Note. FIML estimation; monthly data 1975"1-1985:5; symbols for variables in the 
Appendix; V t is the stochastic term of equation II; see (24) and (25) for the construc- 
tion of o~ and l,~. The equations I and II are: 
+ova_,. Oi) 
tion function captures the essence of (21) but takes account, through 
a logistic specification, of the nonlinearities involved by the 2.25 percent 
target zone for the BF/DM exchange rate. A "leaning against the 
wind" term is also added. 
Discretionary interventions are thus computed as the residuals of 
the following intervention function (t-stat. in parentheses): 
1.0225 w* - w r 
I, = 0.53 + 6.36 log + 53.61 (wt -  wt- 1). (25) 
(0.32) (7.13) w,-0.9775 w* (5.00) 
R 2 = 0.40 D - W  = 1.68 
Table 3 reports the results of simultaneous FIM L estimation of the 
equations for At and R t . The latter equation has a nonlinear specifica- 
tion, as the conditional variance of the exchange rate 0r~ necessarily 
affects the risk premium in a multiplicative way, see (20). The FIML 
technique also allows the taking into account of cross-correlations 
between the stochastic terms of both equations as well as of first-order 
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autocorrelation in the risk premium equation. With the exception of 
the current account variable in the covered interest parity equation 
and the foreign interest rate in the risk premium equation, all variables 
come out with the expected sign (recall that a 2 affects the absolute 
value of the risk premium through the parameter 0) and are mostly 
highly significant. The results obtained moreover clearly show that 
both A t and R t are strongly affected by the expected future exchange 
rate. The conditional variance of the exchange rate also appears as a 
major determinant of R t and, although less significantly so, of A t. 
These results therefore illustrate and do globally corroborate our 
analysis of the insulation properties of the dual market cum capital 
controls on the official spot and forward markets. 
V. Conclusions 
Changes in the timing of international trade payments as well as 
arbitrage between the spot and the forward market disrupt the func- 
tioning of a dual exchange market, even when complete separation 
between the official and the financial segments is postulated. We have 
examined how capital controls imposed on the official spot and for- 
ward markets work to preserve the insulation properties of the dual 
market. Spot market controls operate as increases in transaction costs 
associated with changes in the timing of payments. Quantitative con- 
trols on forward positions are parameterized in a coefficient which 
also describes agents' attitude towards risk and have effects similar to 
those of an increase in risk aversion. Imposition of both types of 
controls increase deviations from uncovered interest parity, the spot 
controls by increasing deviations from covered interest parity, the 
forward controls by increasing the forward risk premium. 
Although our analysis has been inspired by the experience of the 
Belgo-Luxembourg dual market, its applicability goes beyond this 
particular case. Our model can indeed be construed to represent an 
economy in which all transactions take place on a unified market, 
but where, because of the curtailment of other capital transactions, 
changes in the timing of trade receipts and payments and in the extent 
of forward cover of commercial transactions are quasi the only source 
of speculative capital flows. Some LDCs come close to this kind of 
economy, in which controls of the type analyzed here are pervasive 
and where the black exchange market plays the role of the free finan- 
cial market in a dual system. 
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Appendix 
1. R a t i o n a l  E x p e c t a t i o n s  S o l u t i o n  
To keep the analysis tractable we focus on the dynamics of the 
official exchange rates around their steady state, postulating steady 
state values for the other variables (the domestic price level, the finan- 
cial exchange rates) which a full structural model would include (see 
Black and Salemi 1988 for a similar approach). Interventions are 
completely sterilized (co =0). Exogenous uncertainty is limited to ur 
and Idt (see (17) and (21)). The dynamics is therefore exclusively the 
consequence of exporters' and importers' decisions concerning their 
forward operations and payment timing. It is introduced through St, 
the net spot sale of foreign currency resulting from period t - 1  de- 
cision not to cover completely exports receipts (import payments) 
due at t. Given equilibrium in the forward market at t - 1 ,  St= 
(Et- 1 wt - f t  - 1)/0, where Et- 1 wt is the rationally expected period t spot 
rate, given the period t - 1  information set. The unconditional ex- 
pected steady state values of f and w are f =  C/O and v~ = w* (see (20), 
(21)). The stationary forward rate is equal to the nominal exchange 
rate which equilibrates the commercial balance. 
With co = 0 it is possible to compute the following rational expec- 
tation path for we (Pesaran 1987, p. 115): 
1 ?+0+070 
w, = #,w,_ 1 +(1- /z l )w* - - -  (u,--I.,,) (A.1) 
1-2#1 t2 
with / ~ l = x - ~ ,  where x = ( l + o ~ + f 2 ) / 2 ,  b = r / i ;  
f2 = g(~+O+o?O) + (1 +o0)r/i;  2= 1/I2 ; 
and E(u~+l) = E(Ia,+O = O. 
This simple dynamic solution exhibits the familiar saddle path 
characteristic,/zl being the stable root (0 </~1 < 1). The coefficient of 
(ut-Iat) can be expected to be positive for a large number of possible 
combinations of parameters. The one-period-ahead conditional vari- 
ance of the exchange rate, a z, is then equal to: 
0.2 F'-~ 0-~- O' 012 
= L(-I (A.2) 
2 is the variance of (us-Idt). Note that this is only an implicit where 0.u 
solution for 0.2, as the risk parameter 0 which appears in the RHS of 
(A.2) is a function of 0.2 (see (20)). As an illustration of the implications 
of (A.1) and (A.2), consider the effects of a change in the parameter 0 
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which measures the intensity of the authorities' interventions. An 
increase in 0 lowers/~1 and therefore increases the speed at which w, 
converges towards w*. The increase in g also lowers the coefficient of 
2 in the RHS of(A.2) which reflects the stabilizing impact ofinterven- ~r u 
tions on the conditional variance of the exchange rate (a2). 










D m  
Dxt 
DUIP = 
f ,  = 
g = 
Hnff ~- 
H x t  ~- 
it-- 1, rt--1 = 
Idt 
m ,  II -~- 
Mr, X, = 
p*, q* = 
R t 
s ,  = 
U t ~- 
= coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
= exporter's, importer's and average transaction cost 
= export price elasticity 
= capital control parameter 
= profit function 
= conditional variance of exchange rate 
= sterilization coefficient 
= deviation from covered interest parity 
= exogenous net exports 
= foreign currency down-payment actually paid by im- 
porters 
= foreign customary level of importers' down-payment 
= foreign currency down-payment actually received by ex- 
porters 
customary level of exporters' received down-payment 
deviation from uncovered interest parity (A, + R,) 
one-period forward rate prevailing at time t 
intensity of central bank intervention with respect to the 
spot rate 
importer's purchase of forward foreign currency 
exporter's sale of forward foreign currency 
foreign and domestic money rate 
official exchange market intervention (demand for for- 
eign currency) 
discretionary part of intervention 
number of importers and of exporters 
volume of imports and of exports 
foreign currency price of exports and of imports 
risk premium on the forward market 
predetermined sale of spot foreign currency at period t 
illegal transactions on the official spot market (random) 
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wt,w*,~,~ = current, parity, expected future, and future spot ex- 
change rate (random) 
Ym, Yx = importer's and exporter's income transfers 
3. S o u r c e s  
PB: Paribas Bank Brussels, Research Department; interest and 
exchange rate data are compiled from the financial newspaper Echo de 
la Bourse. Access to Datastream was also provided by Paribas. NBB: 
National Bank of Belgium. IRES: Institut de Recherches Economi- 
ques (University of Louvain). MINFIN: Research Department of 
Finance Ministry. 
4. D a t a  
Domestic interest rate: one-month BF interbank rate (end of 
month), PB, Foreign interest rate: one-month euro-DM rate (end of 
month), PB; Spot official rate: BF/DM rate, end of month data from 
PB; daily rates used to compute the variable "prob" come from NBB 
for the period 03/19/79 to end 85 and from Datastream (crossed BF/s 
and DM/s rates) before 03/19/79. 
Forward official rate: end of month, one-month BF/DM rate, PB; 
LCB, LCD: monthly index of wages and employees compensations 
(on a cost basis) in Belgian and German manufacturing industries, 
respectively: monthly interpolation of quarterly data from IRES (S6- 
ries de base de l'6conomie belge); 1970-73 = 100. 
I: Interventions are computed, at constant exchange rates as 
changes in NBB's net foreign assets less changes of central Govern- 
ment's foreign currency indebtedness. From NBB (Bulletin, balance 
sheets of central bank) and MINFIN (Government Financial Statis- 
tics in Bulletin de Documentation). 
Current account balance: monthly interpolation of current ac- 
count balance published by NBB on a transactions basis. 
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A b s t r a c t: Capital Controls and International Trade Finance in a Dual Ex- 
change Rate Regime: The Belgian Experience Post-Mortem. - The purpose of the paper 
is to model "leads and lags" capital flows on the official segment of a dual exchange 
market and to examine the effects of various types of capital controls imposed by 
authorities on the official spot and forward exchange markets. The focus of the analysis 
is the degree of insulation provided by a "dual exchange market cum capital controls" 
in face of a speculative crisis. The crucial variables in this respect are the deviation from 
covered interest parity and the forward risk premium. Results of the theoretical model 
are confronted with empirical evidence over the 1975-85 period. 
JEL No. F31, F32, F36 
Z u s a m m e n fa s s u n g: Kapitalkontrollen und die Finanzierung des internatio- 
nalen Handels in einem dualen Wechselkurssystem. Riickblick auf die belgischen Erfah- 
rungen. - Der Zweck dieses Aufsatzes ist es, Leads and Lags bei Kapitalstr6men im 
offiziellen Teil eines segmentierten Devisenmarktes zu modelfieren und zu untersuchen, 
welche Wirkungen verschiedene beh6rdlich auferlegte Kapitalkontrollen auf die Kassa- 
und Terminkurse der offiziellen Devisenmarkte haben. Die Analyse konzentriert sich 
darauf zu ermitteln, welches AusmaB an Abschottung ein ,,dualer Devisenmarkt mit 
Kapitalkontrollen" im Falle einer spekulativen Krise erm6glicht. Die entscheidenden 
Variablen in dieser Hinsicht sind die Abweichung von der gesicherten Zinsparitat und 
die Risikopr/imie aufdem Terminmarkt. Die Ergebnisse aus dem theoretischen ModeU 
werden dem empirischen Befund aus der Periode 1975-85 gegeniibergestellt. 
